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SIMULATIONS TO ANALYZE CELLULAR VOTING SYSTEMS FOR
SIDE EFFECTS OF DEMOCRATIC REDISTRICTING
LUCIUS T. SCHOENBAUM
Abstract. Motivated by the problem of partisan gerrymandering, we introduce an electoral
system for a representative democracy called democratic cellular voting designed to make modern
packing and cracking strategies irrelevant by allowing districts to be influenced directly by voters
through elections. We introduce an example of a democratic cellular voting system, called CV0,
that is suitable for dynamic modelling. We develop a modification of the theory of discrete Markov
chains using the algebraic structure of the semiring [0,∞], which is used as a space of correlation
coefficients. We use this to measure voter preferences and model representatives, voters, and
districts in computationally feasible models with a guarantee of long-term stability.
NOTE: this is a preliminary version of this paper. The results of the simulations are still
pending.
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2 LUCIUS T. SCHOENBAUM
The genius of Republican liberty, seems to
demand on one side, not only that all
power should be derived from the people;
but, that those entrusted with it should
be kept in dependence on the people, by a
short duration of their appointments; and,
that, even during this short period, the
trust should be placed not in a few, but in
a number of hands.
James Madison [17]
My intellect is so limited, Lord, that I can
only trust in you to preserve me as I
should be.
Flannery O’Conner [21]
1. Introduction
Democratic norms and institutions are currently under stress [8] due in part to changes in the
political landscape brought about by technology used in elections [29], the media [22], and daily
life [16]. These trends have been accompanied by remarkable trends in the United States Congress.
Partisanship in the U.S. House is at an historic high after increasing exponentially over the past
60 years [3]. Recent Congresses, under both political parties, have seen approval ratings drop to
historically unprecedented lows, as low as 9% in 2013 [9,10], while Gallup polling on satisfaction with
the direction the country has not risen above 37% since 2005 [11]. A recent study has indicated that
Congress does not respond to average citizen preferences, but does respond to preferences expressed
by economic elites [12]. In the 2012 election for U.S. House seats, the Democrats nationally won
59,214,910 votes, while Republicans won 57,622,827, according to the tally of the Clerk of the
House [14], yet Republicans won 33 more seats than Democrats.1 There is evidence [24, 28] that
this imbalance occured due to partisan gerrymandering in a handful of states after the 2010 census.
Attention to the issue of gerrymandering in the research community has grown in recent years
[2,7,13,18]. In [6], Bernstein and Duchin define gerrymandering as the drawing of political bound-
aries with an ulterior motive. Gerrymandering can be racial gerrymandering, which seeks to min-
imize the influence of racial minority groups in Congress, incumbent gerrymandering, in which
politicians ensure victory for incumbent politicians regardless of their party affiliation, or parti-
san gerrymandering, in which districts are drawn that artificially inflate the number of members
from one political party. Gerrymandering is achieved by creating useful votes for one group and
wasted votes for a competing group. This can be by packing, or drawing a district that contains
an overwhelming majority of voters from one party (who therefore waste the surplus of votes), or
by cracking, or dividing a geographic region that favors one outcome into two or more smaller ones
inside of districts containing a majority population that favors a different outcome.
The suspicion or accusation of gerrymandering has existed at least since the term was first
coined by the Boston Gazette in 1812. The Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue three times.
1Republicans won a majority by vote and by seats in 2014 and 2016. Prior to 2012, the party whose national vote
majority exceeded the other major party won the majority going back until 2000, the last year that elections were
held based on the 1990 Census. In that year, Republicans lost 2 seats while Democrats won 1. The vote differential
nation-wide was R/D 410,216.
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In earlier eras discussion in the courts has been over whether gerrymandering is a justicial issue.
Today this is settled: intentional partisan gerrymandering is a justicial issue. However, there is
no agreement at all in the court system on what constitutes intentional gerrymandering, and if
so the basis on which it can be prosecuted. Since Davis v. Bandemer (1986), the view of the
Supreme Court has been that the mere lack of proportional representation is not a sufficient basis
for unconstitutional discrimination.
The efficiency gap, introduced by law professor Nicholas Stephanopoulous and political scientist
Eric McGhee [28], is defined as the number of votes wasted divided by the number of votes cast.
Stephanopoulous and McGhee argue in part that the efficiency gap isolates partisan gerrymander-
ing’s effect, and provides an accurate measure of its magnitude that did not exist when the Davis v.
Bandemer decision was made. An unconstitutional state map according to Stephanopoulous and
McGhee’s evaluation would have an efficiency gap higher than 7-8% in favor of the party in control.
In arguments before the Supreme Court in Ghil v. Whitford, heard on October 3, 2017, districts
drawn for the Wisconsin State Assembly by the Republicans were held to be unconstitutional based
on evidence of intentional partisan gerrymandering, along with the fact that the efficiency gaps were
determined to be 10% in 2012 and 13% in 2014. The Supreme Court will decide among other things
whether the efficiency gap can be used as a basis for rulings on the constitutionality of district maps
drawn by one party.
This paper approaches the issue of gerrymandering through mathematical modeling of voting
systems other than single-district, plurality voting, i.e., our familiar voting system of today. The
basic point of departure is a voting system called democratic cellular voting that specifically targets
the issue of gerrymandering. Rather than developing a framework for thinking about democratic
cellular voting as a general family of voting systems, we invest the majority of our time in what is
already rather a challenge, namely defining an example system, called CV0.
The basic ideas in this first system CV0, as described in more detail in sections 4 and 5, are the
following:
(1) cellular partitioning as a foundation for district creation, resembling the finite element
method [23], a common approach to systems in continuous domains,
(2) overlapping districts obtained by simple weighted statistical averaging and the “one person,
one vote” principle applied as a system axiom,
(3) selection of districts through voter and their respective candidate decision-making and
preference-weighting under competitive cooperation and incentivization regimes,
(4) geometric compactness metrics to prevent the incursion of political bias and gerrymandering
in the drawing of cells,
(5) a notion of valence revision (of a representative) that enhances voter accountability even
for representatives in “safe” districts.
The main point is that the combination of compactness at the cellular level and democratic input
at all higher levels throws up a bulwark against gerrymandering (see section 4.6).
In sections 2 and 3 we develop the mathematics we need for CV0’s modeling. In section 4 we
describe a democratic cellular voting system in skeletal outline as though it were a quote-unquote
“real” voting system. This will help us with modeling, in particular identifying which parts of the
model are realistic and which parts are ideal. In section 5 we describe the model CV0 itself in broad
outline. We conclude with final remarks and mention how the work might be ongoing in section 6.
This is a preliminary version of this paper. The results of the simulations are still pending. We
will report on these simulations when they are completed, in an update to this paper.
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2. The Semiring [0,∞]
Semirings have recently received attention in tropical geometry, where much focus is on the
max-plus algebra R ∪ {−∞}. Here, our focus will instead be on the algebra [0,∞] of nonnegative
numbers, plus an ideal infinite number. Let us observe that under addition and multiplication,
[0,∞] is a semiring with not one, but two zero elements Z satifying a ·Z = Z · a = Z for all a, with
one of them dominant in the sense that Z1 + Z2 = Z1. Moreover, just like the max-plus algebra it
is a semifield, provided we exclude the inverse requirement for both of these two zeros.
We consider the action of [0,∞] on state vectors, that is, vectors of real numbers in the interval
[0, 1], given by
(1) a · x = xai
where a ∈ [0,∞], x is a state vector, xi is the ith component of x, and we put a∞ = 0 for all a in
[0, 1]. This includes a = 1, which is the symmetric opposite of 00 = 1. With respect to this action,
two zero elements 0 and ∞ can be thought of probabilistically as being overrides, making an event
either certain or impossible, respectively.
We assemble state vectors (assume the size of the vectors to be fixed) into a semimodule V over
[0,∞], which we call a semi-vector space, under the operation
x⊕ y = (xiyi)
and the action (1) of exponentiation. Observe that there is an additive unit (1, 1, . . . , 1) and an
additive zero (0, 0, . . . , 0) in V . The rest of the axioms are easy to verify.
Linear maps on V may now be defined. If we define the natural inner product
(x, y) = yx11 y
x2
2 . . . y
xn
n
and matrix multiplication based on this inner product, we obtain a nonassociative ring of matrices.
This ring may be thought of as loglinear, not in the statistical sense [1], but in the sense that a
linear map described by a matrix
f(x) = A · x,
where (·) is the extension of the action (1), can be computed using the formula
f(x) = exp(A log x), x ∈ V ,
where A is a matrix over [0,∞] and the functions exp, log are taken component-wise. Note the
appearance of ordinary matrix multiplication, which extends to compositions: if
g(f(x)) = B ·A · x,
associating from the right, then we have this equal to the expression
(2) exp(BA log x),
where the product BA is matrix multiplication. In fact, this relationship to matrix multiplication
arises as a substitute for associativity
A · (B · C) = (AB) · C,
as the multiplication (·) is not associative. This reasoning clearly extends to arbitrary products,
giving a feasible way of computing such matrices. The semi-vector space V can be extended to a
full vector space, and norms for these spaces can be defined.
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Figure 1.
3. Steady State Theory for Models with Causation and Correlation
3.1. The desired modification of discrete Markov chain theory. Our first goal in this section
is to generalize discrete Markov chain theory in the manner needed for our purposes. The main
issue is that the class of matrices of interest has real entries. There has been work done on extending
the Perron-Frobenius theorem and related theory to this class of matrices [20,30], but it is focused
on the eventually nonnegative case, while we have in mind the semiring [0,∞]. So our attention
is on the quasi-stochastic case (defined below). Such matrices need not be eventually nonnegative,
and they may not have a positive eigenvector. An example of such a matrix is 0.9 -0.1 0.10.2 0.9 0.2
-0.1 0.2 0.7

with steady state vector (−1/6, 2/3, 1/2).
Some basic terminology: We say that a vector x is positive, (nonnegative), x > 0 (x ≥ 0), if
every component xi satisfies xi > 0 (xi ≥ 0, respectively). In particular, all components are real. A
matrix A is positive (nonnegative) if it is positive (nonnegative) when viewed as a vector. A matrix
A is diagonally positive if aii > 0 for all i. More terminology: A matrix A is eventually positive (or
primitive) if there exists k such that Ak is positive. A is eventually nonnegative if there exists k
such that Ak is nonnegative.
The directed graph of square matrix A is the directed graph G(A) with vertices labeled 1, . . . , n,
where A has size n, and a path from i to j if and only if aij 6= 0. A is irreducible if G(A) is strongly
connected (cf. [30]).
Recall that a matrix A has dominant eigenvalue λ1 if the eigenvalues λ1, λ2, . . . , λn of A (counted
by multiplicity so that n is the side length of A) satisfy |λ1| < |λ2| ≤ · · · ≤ |λn|.
All matrices we study will be weakly stochastic:
Definition 1. A matrix A is weakly stochastic if it is square, has real entries, and has columns that
sum to 1.
Let A be weakly stochastic. Thus A has 1 as eigenvalue, since A and AT have the same eigenvalues
and AT trivially has eigenvector (1, . . . , 1) with eigenvalue 1. Moreover all other eigenvalues λ of A
satisfy |λ| < 1 or |λ| > 1 due to the Gershgorin circle theorem (see Figure 1).
The following terminology for describing features in a weakly stochastic matrix is helpful for our
purposes.
Definition 2. Let A be a diagonally positive matrix. An inflationary term is a term 0 < aii < 1 on
the diagonal. A deflationary term is a term 1 < aii <∞ on the diagonal. An zero inflation term is
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a term precisely aii = 1 on the diagonal. For present purposes, a pair, referring to a matrix A, is
a pair aij and aji of off-diagonal terms. A control feedback pair is a pair with each member of the
pair having different sign.
A resonant feedback pair is a pair with both members negative. An op-resonant feedback pair is
a pair with both members positive.
Definition 3. A matrix A is non-reinforcing if every inflationary term is not a part of a resonant
feedback term, and every deflationary term is not part of an op-resonant feedback term.
Definition 4. A matrix A is quasi-stochastic if:
(1) it is square,
(2) it is weakly stochastic and diagonally positive,
(3) it is non-reinforcing.
Conjecture 3.1. A quasi-stochastic matrix has dominant eigenvalue 1, hence the limit
lim
k→∞
Ak = pi1T
exists, where 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) and pi is a vector.
We will prove this in an update of this paper. If it is not true, it will assuredly be true in enough
cases not to in any way imperil the desired application of section 5.
4. Voting Cells
4.1. Geography. Recall that a democratic cellular voting system is one in which districts are
formed out of cells in a democratic way (i.e., through elections). The land is therefore separated
into voting cells. We now give a technical definition for the cells:
Definition 5. A voting cell is the basic unit of voting. It is an extent of land that is contiguous
(connected) to the the maximum extent permitted by natural land features. Cells may not overlap
and cells must cover the nation’s entire area. Each voter belongs to (is a member of, etc.) the cell
containing the voter’s registered address for voting purposes. Cells must satisfy the Gerrymandering
Requirements which may vary depending on how the system is implemented (see below). A voting
cell’s area is the area in the usual sense (as measured by surveyors, etc.) Two cells are adjacent if
they share at least one boundary point in common. Each cell, we shall say, contains approximately
1000 voters (±10%) at its formation. As cells grow, they are divided into two, each of them
1000±10%, as before.2
How many people are 1,000 people?
(1) The population of the Municipality and Borough of Skagway, Alaska is 920, or around 400
households (see Figure 2).
(2) Estimating that there are 28,000 blocks in the city of Chicago, which has a population
of 2,695,598, a city block would contain on average 96 people, so 1,000 people would be,
geographically, roughly 10 blocks. Chicago would be divided into roughly 2,500 cells the
size of about 10 city blocks each.
2Another possibility is that maps are redrawn periodically into new cells that respect the Gerrymandering Re-
quirements. However, if cells change during the cellular map revision, all the existing districts are potentially affected
and the preference information (from both voters and representatives) reflected in the previous map gets lost. If
instead the cells are allowed to divide (say, along the boundaries suggested by the splitline algorithm) then the
existing multi-cellular districts can continue to persist in the new maps as before.
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Figure 2. Skagway, Alaska (Pop. 920) Photo: [19]
(3) Estimating that there are 2,000 blocks on the island of Manhattan (New York County)
which has a population of 1,643,734, a city block would contain on average 800 people.
Manhattan would be divided into roughly 1,600 cells, each the size of 1-2 city blocks each.
(4) Estimating that an average “small town” has a population density around 800 people per
square mile, such an area would be divided into cells that are geographically approximately
1 square mile.
Each of these cells would be the minimal areas which, if elected, a citizen could represent in
Congress. The area of the 10th most populous state, Ohio, for example, would be separated into
approximately 11,600 cells. In most states there would be (as in this example) around 700 cells per
modern U.S. House district. This applies to any state, as congressional districts are all drawn to
be the same size by head count, or approximately 700,000 today.
The Gerrymandering Requirements might be one of the following:
(1) The cells might be determined by the splitline algorithm [27].
(2) The cells might be required to pass a strict, or area-weighted Polsby-Popper compactness
threshold. Area weighting might be employed in order to relax the compactness requirement
for cells with a large area.
Affairs in each cell would be managed by a Chief Cellular Officer, who is either elected or
appointed by the reasonable choice of official, such as the governer of the state. Chief Cellular
Officers report to Regional Offices. The Chief Cellular Officer must keep an office, and be available
for meetings with citizens. Cellular offices might be installed at a local City Hall, or inside the
nearest post office.
4.2. Valence. The voting system we propose to model in this paper is as follows. Voting occurs
once per cycle t; we do not specify the length of a cycle. Voters vote on candidates for office, who
may be incumbents, in the sense that they represented the cell during the previous cycle t − 1.
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Figure 3. Example ballot. Only two questions shown.
Henceforth in this discussion we make no distinction between candidates and incumbents and refer
to them all as representatives. Voters vote on representatives once per cycle, and their vote may
be either Yes, No, or Neutral. (See Figure 3 for a simple, informal example ballot.) These votes
are tallied to determine each representative’s valence. Valence is a formal, ballot-box-determined
version of what is known as strength, or political strength, in politics. The idea is simple: the more
people vote for you, the more your valence goes up. The more people vote against you, the more
your valence goes down. People who vote but vote neutral do not affect your valence, but, valence
only depends on the size of the voting population, not the population size at large. With that being
said, here is the formal definition of valence.
Let C = c1, . . . , cK be the set of cells, let R = r1, . . . , rM be the set of representatives. During
the cycle t each cell has a set P (c, t) of active voters. For each representative r, for each cell c, and
for each cycle t, the value
A(r, c, t) =
∑
v votes Yes
v∈P (c,t)
1 −
∑
v votes No
v∈P (c,t)
1
is the number of Yes votes minus the number of No votes for representative r in cell c in cycle t.
Then the raw tally score is:
Tally(r, c, t) =
A(r, c, t)
|P (c, t)| × 100.
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Here’s a simpler breakdown that a member of cell c might use: if Y is the number of Yes votes for
candidate r, and N is the number of No votes for candidate r, and NT is the number of Neutral
votes for candidate r, then
Y −N
Y +N +NT
× 100
is the raw tally awarded to representative r by cell c. Notice that the quantity Y +N +NT , which
we call the raw valence of the cell c, does not depend on representative r and is equal to the number
of members of the total population of cell c who voted in cycle t. Raw tallies thus fall between
−100 and 100. The raw tally is therefore a measure of simply who won and who lost in the cell,
and by how much.
Based on the raw tallies, each representative r is awarded a valence by cell c in cycle t, which
holds during cycle t+ 1:
V al(r, c, t+ 1) = max
(
0,
Tally(r, c, t)∑
r∈R,Tally(r,c,t)>0 Tally(r, c, t)
)
× 100.
Note the invariant that for all cycles t,∑
r∈R
V al(r, c, t) = 100.
Representatives whose valence at the cellular level is zero has that cell flagged for removal from
their district (the district they are running in, not the district they hold). In other words, they are
deemed to have “lost” in that cell and cannot represent that cell in Congress. Such a cell will not
be included in that representative’s district during the next cycle t+ 1.
Now let P (t) be the set of all voters who voted in all the cells in cycle t. We define the valence
of representative r during the cycle t+ 1 to be:
V al(r, t+ 1) =
∑
c∈C |P (c, t)| · V al(r, c, t+ 1)
|P (t)| .
We have thus assigned each representative a valence between 0 and 100. We have defined the total
invariantly in the sense that for every cycle t,∑
r∈R
V al(r, t) = 100.
Note that the contribution to V al(r, t+1) made by cell c in cycle t depends on the quantity |P (c, t)|.
It will be higher if more people vote.
Votes in Congress during cycle t are taken as follows: for any vote on a motion to proceed, on a
bill’s passage, etc., a vote is made by each representative, who votes either Yay, Nay, or Abstain.
The clerk records the Yay votes and the Nay votes, and notes who has abstained. The vote is then
calculated as:
R =
∑
r votes Yay
V al(r, t)−
∑
r votes Nay
V al(r, t).
If R > 0, the motion is passed. In a tie, the vote may be retaken.
4.3. Cognitive Burden. There is a problem here that we do not wish to disguise. It has to do
with what we call cognitive burden, or the work that voters are expected to do in order to make
the voting system function. For our work in this paper, we have chosen to leave this problem out
of consideration.
For some short discussion of where we stand on the cognitive burden issue, see section 6.
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4.4. The Question on the Ballot. We can easily imagine a more refined measure of voter pref-
erence in the tally of the election. For instance, we could ask voters to vote on a scale of 1 to
5, with 3 being neutral, 4 being a vote of support, 5 being strong support, 2 for do not support,
and 1 for strongly do not support. We could imagine going even further. We could imagine asking
voters to quote a number between 0 and 1! However, some subset of the voters would be expected
to recognize that in order to have their own vote weigh most heavily on the outcome, they should
adopt the strategy of voting as strongly as they are allowed to, in every instance where they have
an opinion one way or the other, either Yes or No. Other voters, who might not be as inclined
to abuse the system, would recognize that other voters might adopt this strategy, and respond in
kind. Any such system can therefore be expected to have at most three options for the voter to
choose from on any question on the ballot: Yes, No, or Neutral.
4.5. Political Parties and the Problem of Career Advancement. It is historically rare for
a member in the U.S. House of Representatives, the lower house of Congress, to resist the will of
one of the major parties [15]. There are many reasons for this, one of which is that for a House
member, there is a remarkably small window for professional advancement.
House members, like all politicians, having begun a career as a statesman or stateswoman serving
their country, naturally aspire to run for a higher office. What can they run for? House members
sometimes run for president. Since 1900, the former Presidents who are also former House members
are: George H. W. Bush (Texas’s 7th district), Richard M. Nixon (California’s 12th district), and
John F. Kennedy (Massachusetts’s 11th district). These former representatives all ran successfully
for president—but in these instances, the jump from House member to president was indirect
(Senator seats, in the case of Nixon and Kennedy, and Vice President, in the case of Nixon and
Bush). Other former House members who were presidents (Gerald R. Ford and Lyndon B. Johnson)
gained the office without having run in an election.
Another option is to run for the Senate. In 2004, for example, David Vitter successfully ran for
Senate, having represented Louisiana’s 1st district in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1999
to 2002. Tom Cotton did so successfully in 2014, having represented Arkansas’s 4th congressional
district since 2013. There are innumerable similar cases. In 17 instances all prior to the modern
era (post World War II), House members were also appointed to the Supreme Court.
House members also sometimes choose to leave Washington, DC to run for high office in their
home state. This occurred for example in 2010 when Rahm Emanuel, a former member of the U.S.
House of Representatives for Illinois’s 5th congressional district, left Washington, DC to run for
mayor of Chicago, the office he presently holds. In another instance, Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, a
former member of the House for Louisiana’s 1st congressional district, returned to his home state
to run successfully for governor in 2007, the office he held from 2008 to 2016.
To an outsider, it might seem cause to wonder why it is a fairly regular occurence that a statesman
or stateswoman leaves the nation’s capital, after having won a position in the nation’s foremost
lawmaking body, and instead opts for life in a state office. It is sometimes said that this is because
as a U.S. House member, you are but one voice in a body of over 400 individuals. This may weigh on
some decisions. But the simple math that House members face also plays a role. By the Permanent
Apportionment Act of 1929, the size of the U.S. House of Representatives is fixed at 435 (leading to
an average district population size of approximately 700,000 today). With governorships included,
this gives a body of 435 room for advancement to only 151 new seats, or 152, if you include Vice
President. Then again, the vast majority of those seats are not available to all representatives,
because they funnel through the states. In a state such as Ohio, for example, there are 16 House
members having 4 seats for advancement between them. Two of these come up for reelection only
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once every six years, and are not term limited offices; these are the two Senate seats. One of these
is the presidency; the other is the governorship. The smaller a state’s population, the greater the
opportunity for advancement: Alaska, Delaware, Vermont, Wyoming, Montana and the Dakotas
all have the smallest representation possible (one member). These members each have 4 paths for
advancement. Their opposites are the four states with 20 or more representatives: California (53),
Texas (36), New York (27), and Florida (27). California, with a delegation of 53 House members,
also has 4 seats for advancement, one of which is the same presidency that politicians from all states
aspire to.
No matter how popular a representative becomes, there is no way he or she can grow her base
(the population of his or her district) except by one of these crowded paths. This inertia of a House
seat applies not only if one attempts to leave it, but also if it is held, in that there is no incentive
to increase enthusiasm or improve one’s popularity in one’s district above and beyond the plurality,
first-past-the-post (in most states) vote that occurs once every two years—often, today, in a safe
seat. Once you are elected, being a House member is an environment lacking natural opportunities
for long term advancement, with one notable exception: the opportunities on offer through the
party system. The party you belong to provides you with the opportunity to rise up the ranks, and
thereby obtain powerful committee seats and leadership roles, have an influence on scheduling, bill
markups, appointments, and so on. Thus the limited avenues for advancement create the conditions
for high, even obsequious loyalty to party, and voting that goes down mechanically along party lines.
The phenomenon that is expected under these incentives is documented by Ansolabehere, et al. [4],
who note that, in their words:
All candidates, the thinking goes, pursue centrist strategies within their districts,
so the winners should accurately reflect the desires of the greatest number of voters.
Evidence for this belief is the strong correlation between the winners’ (incumbents)
roll-call voting records and the ideological leanings of the districts. Our analysis
suggests this pattern is much weaker than commonly believed. While there is a
statistically significant amount of responsiveness, it is not the main story. Compet-
ing candidates in congressional elections almost never converge. Instead, the strong
correlation between incumbents’ and districts’ ideologies arises almost entirely be-
cause voters are presented with largely partisan choices and select the candidate
whose party more closely resembles them [4, p. 152].
The career outlook of a representative in a democratic cellular voting system looks much different.
A successful representative can choose to target an enlarged base with every new election, and
tailor that base to their own personal strengths and weaknesses as a candidate. Representatives
can contemplate expanding into neighboring state-sized areas and, if successful, eventually ride to
power in entire regions and parts of the country. There is fine-grained, direct voter accountability
to countervail the influence of a party or other interceding organization. Members can appeal to
voters for their support, or denial thereof, if they would like to operate as an independent or as a
party loyalist. If a popular decision is made against a party line, for example, or if an unpopular
decision is made with it, voters can express their thanks, as it were, to the representative by an
increase of his or her valence (see section 4.2), and conversely express their disapproval in a way that
would be felt by the representative, no matter whether he or she won or not in the next election.
This is true regardless of whether the representative is in a safe seat.
4.6. Gerrymandering and District Cultivation. We can now survey the bulwark against ger-
rymandering mentioned in the introduction, put up by a democratic cellular voting system featuring
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the notion of valence of section 4.2. The rolling revision of valence creates an incentive to hew closely
to the majority will of a constituency, even one that exceeds a simple majority. This eliminates
the problem of packing, because a well supported candidate will have the valence to show for it,
compared to one that scrapes past the post: no votes wasted; every vote carries an iota of valence
for every representative sent to Congress. What about cracking? Because all valences are strictly
positive, and percolate up through the results in the cells, voters (at least, up to the cellular level)
have a say on whether a candidate can represent them in congressional votes. No population can be
diluted against its will through any strategic maneuvering by a representative. Should it lack the
representation that it cries out for, a concerted cell can take matters into its own hands. Members
can recruit one of their own, effectively taking their valence off the table. Hence there need be
no wasted votes by cracking either. The efficiency gap, if considered conceptually as a measure of
wasted votes, should remain at a very low level through time.
With all the necessary caveats that the approach is very new and untested, democratic cellular
voting systems therefore offer a potential solution to the problem of gerrymandering. Consider for
example the impossibility theorem of Alexeev and Mixon [2], showing that it is not always math-
ematically possible (!) to satisfy the efficiency gap and Polsby-Popper compactness requirements
simultaneously. According to legal arguments that go along somewhat similar lines, courts have
sometimes argued (on the basis that it is “always difficult to prove a negative”) that the legal system
cannot act based on social science research [25] such as the efficiency gap metric because, among
other issues, actors’s intentions get lost in the process of statistical aggregation. We currently await
the court’s decision in Gil v. Whitford. Whatever happens, however, gerrymandering is an issue
that is handled differently, and well, by the democratic cellular voting model. While districts might
take on “gerrymander” shapes, it will not be due to the effects of gerrymandering, but through the
process of voters finding representatives that speak to them, and through them to the legislature.
These mathematical and legal clouds therefore no longer haunt us.
However, the cure’s side effects are unknown.
5. Dynamic Models of Voter Populations and CV0
In this section we use the mathematical framework of sections 2 and 3 to dynamically model
voters and representatives, as they create districts that evolve on rules that follow the outline of a
democratic cellular voting system in section 4.
When we model voters and representatives, and allow the simulation to evolve over time, we
wish to monitor whether it drifts in an unstable direction, due to polarization or some other type of
clustering. Therefore we seek a guarantee that if the system drifts in a unstable direction, it is due
to the effect of the voting system and not the way in which the model is configured. For this, we
use the modified Markov chain theory of section 3.1 to construct a model with a continuous state
space that comes with a guarantee of long term behavior, i.e., a steady state. For the purpose of
such a model, the mathematical notions of the previous section apply to correlation coefficients on
parameters. In the terminology of section 3.1, a control feedback pair (+,−) is like two parameters,
such as eating and napping. If I eat a meal, then my chance of taking a nap goes up. But if I
take a nap, my chance of eating a meal goes down. An op-resonant feedback pair (+,+) is like
losing a job and developing a bad habit. If I lose a job, my chance of developing a bad habit
goes up. If I develop a bad habit, my chance of losing a job goes up. A resonant feedback pair
(−,−) is like having money and investing wisely. If I have money, my chance of investing it wisely
increases. If I invest money wisely, my chance of having money increases. These pairs are used to
define correlation and causation weights inside the CV0 model. For example, a voter’s attribute of
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employment status might be correlated to their likelihood of moving, and this weighting might be
causal in the sense that one might trigger the other, but the other might not be expected to trigger
the first. Tuning the model is a matter of setting values in a quasi-stochastic matrix.
Note that the steady state configuration will not necessarily be obtained in the model over time,
due to the effects of noise, voting, and relocation.
5.1. Assumptions of the model. Our model has voters, cells, and representatives. Here are
some basic assumptions:
(1) A system or set of attributes is assigned to each model element (voter, cell, or representative).
For a voter these could be, for example: health, job status, cost of living, income. For a
cell, these could be for example: natural beauty, natural resources, population density. For
a representative, these could be for example: talent, skill, experience, charisma, respect
among colleagues, and so on.
(2) An amount of conserved raw material exists for distribution to each element (voter, cell,
or representative) in the slots we use to track attributes over time. This replaces the
assumption in the theory of discrete Markov chains that one works with probability vectors.
This allows the dominant eigenspace to be normalized; otherwise the system’s long term
behavior becomes sensitive to initial conditions. In the case of voters, this is handled
by distributing age, as a hidden variable, to the other parameters. In the case of cells,
this is handled by setting prosperity and comfort slightly in opposition. In the case of
representatives (who are subject to retirement), this is handled by being assigned at random.
(3) Attributes can be correlated (each boosts the other), or causally connected: one can have
a direct effect on the other. It is theoretically possible for one to affect the other positively,
while the other in turn affects the first negatively: it is all coming down to two values for
each pair of attributes chosen.
We make a few notes about behavior to expect in models using the [0,∞] approach:
(1) “Too much of a good thing” principle: Any item A that has a causal connection to another
item B will have effects which taper off as A is augmented.
(2) “No grounding” principle: The meaningful regime for any item A will not include values
past a certain small amount, and the system arrives, when it is defined, with a guarantee
that every item A will regress back to higher values when it dips. This is because the way
the system is set up, in order to allow for a guarantee about long term behavior (steady
state), an item correlated to another item will behave strangely if its value is very small
(close to zero).
5.2. A typical timestep. The sequence of events in a timestep, or election cycle, of the model
CV0 is indicated in Figure 4. For concreteness, we imagine a timestep as the passing of one year,
though only the order of updates matters. The dates are to bring the model in contact with the
idea being modeled.
(1) Cells. The map is divided into cells, as described in section 4. The geography (adjacencies,
etc.) is not modeled, but can be added in later versions. Cells are fixed from one timestep
to the next, but their attributes evolve due to slow (small deviation) correlated, lognormal
noise. Population density of cells for now is governed by voter decision-making alone. The
number K of cells is held constant.
(2) Voters. A voter is essentially a vector of attributes. In particular, voters are not associated
to one another in any way. One of these attributes is age, initialized at 0, and another
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Figure 4. CV0 time step
is location, initialized randomly to a cell. Voter age evolves under correlated, lognormal
noise. When the voter’s age reaches its maximum, currently set at 60, the voter is reset
and randomly initialized. (Intuitively, the voter dies and is replaced with a newly “born”
voter.) The number N of voters is held constant.
(3) Reps. As in section 4.2, there is no distinction between incumbents, candidates, and rep-
resentatives. All are called representatives. Representatives are modeled by reps, which
are again essentially vectors of attributes being updated. Reps are not voters. Most of
their attributes are fixed, but some, such as ambition, may change or be affected by other
attributes, such as momentum. The rep population is the set of all representatives. The
distinction between those who do and do not hold a seat has little relevancy in the current
model, because there is no feedback from the reps to the cells or voters. In particular there
is no entity Congress in the model, no voting or governmental activities by reps that affect
either voters or cells. All that is modeled is the affinity and preferences of voters and reps,
along with their locations (districts, respectively). Each rep has a home cell, the cell where
they first ran (or first won a seat, you can say, if they eventually won there). The total
number M of reps is held constant.
(4) Moving. At each timestep the cells on the map are ranked by each voter. The general,
widely held preference not to move is built into the rankings, so each voter’s present location
is awarded a generous premium. The voter moves if the highest ranked location exceeds
his present location. In particular, each voter is assumed to have perfect and complete
information about cells when decisions about location are made. There is no barrier to
moving other than the innate preference not to move, which is correlated to other attributes
such as income, savings, etc. High population density negatively impacts voter location
ranking but this varies by voter.
(5) Running. All reps automatically run for reelection (or election, as the case may be) until
they “retire” (see below). At every timestep there are two districts associated to each rep:
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the jump district and the seat district. The latter can be null if the rep does not yet hold
a seat. The size of any district is the number of cells it contains. The seat district is the
district that the rep currently represents, from which the rep derives his or her current
valence. In the model currently, this doesn’t have too much effect other than determining
the rep’s stratum, and feeding back into voter location decisions. Jump districts are updated
early in each cycle using a preference ranking that varies from rep to rep, and is updated
during each election cycle. Districts that are highly ranked are added to the jump district;
the exact number depends on attributes such as ambition, momentum, etc. and the rep’s
stratum (see below).
(6) Voting. Voters vote Yes or No on the question of whether a jump district is approved, by
ordering the reps using a preference score assigned to each rep. These preferences are con-
verted into votes via a neutrality threshold, currently set at 48-52% favorable. A preference
higher than that is converted into a vote of Yes on the rep if the rep is running in the cell,
and a vote below that is a No. Reps not running in the cell are voted Neutral automati-
cally by all voters in the cell. Voting in the model is a frictionless, costless record of the
voting population’s sentiment. After the location updates, the voter rolls are automatically
updated. There is no voter registration. All voters vote. After the voting is calculated,
valences are calculated from the votes using the formulas in section 4.2.
(7) New reps. After each election some reps may retire. Their attributes are reset and randomly
initialized. New reps have no sitting district, and their jump district is set to the home cell
of the retiring rep they replace. This is stratum zero, see below.
(8) Strata. Strata begin at zero and increase indefinitely. The highest stratum is determined
by the value K. Strata are denoted S0, S1, S2, . . . . With each stratum Si is defined a
value si, the size factor at Si, and a value gi, the growth factor at Si. The values g1, g2, . . .
and the values s1, s2, . . . increase. Each rep has a stratum, which is initialized to zero. A
stratum is entered by a rep when a rep’s seat district’s size exceeds si. Strata determine
what occurs when the jump district is updated. When a rep is in stratum Si, the number
of districts the rep may add updating his or her jump district is at most gi. It may be less
than that or it may be zero. The number cannot be less than zero: the only way a cell
can be removed from a rep’s district is through decay (negative valence: see section 4.2).
After the election and the raw tallies are found, valences are calculated, but they are not
yet assigned. First, the Win Rule is applied to each jump district: if the valence of the
rep exceeds the valence of every other rep in the same stratum whose district intersects
that rep’s district in one or more cells, then the rep is said to have Won, and the rep’s seat
district is updated to the jump district in the next time step, minus the decay that occured.
Otherwise the rep is said to have Lost. In that case the rep’s losscount is incremented, and
the rep’s seat district is not modified, but any decay that occured is applied. An exception
occurs if the rep’s jump district is the same as the seat district. In that case, the losscount
is not incremented. After this, all the seat districts have been updated, and the strata are
then updated accordingly. If a rep’s stratum changes, his losscount is reset.
(9) Retirement. Reps retire if their losscount exceeds a value currently set at 4, if they remain
in a given stratum for a number of timesteps currently set at 10, or if they drop by two or
more strata in a single time step.
There is a universally distributed penalty/reward each year that models economic outcomes,
and feeds into the decision making and preference ranking functions. However this function is
memoriless. More realistic boom/bust patterns are not modeled.
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5.3. Implementation. Our modeling was done using an early 2015 MacBook Pro running OS X
version 10.12.6 (Sierra). We built the model in C++11 using tools from the standard library, the
Boost library [5], and the Armadillo package [26]. The results and analysis of our simulations will
be released in an update of this paper. Our source code will be released along with results and
analysis.
6. Conclusion
One of the potential costs of any protection against gerrymandering is the cognitive burden on
voters. By cognitive burden we refer to the intellectual work that each voter has to do in order
to participate in the system. The limit on cognitive burden is a basic reason why representative
democracy exists in the first place, since without it, in the terminology of section 4.2, a perfectly
good system could assign each representative valence 1N , where N is the total population, and would
require ordinary citizens to participate in the Congressional process. This system is known as direct
democracy. The system of democratic cellular voting outlined in section 4 has a cognitive burden
lying somewhere between that of direct democracy and that of a familiar republican democracy
with a fixed-district plurality voting system.
The mathematical model CV0 introduced in section 5 is a convenient model, and it is completely
defined, i.e., it could be put in practice, theoretically speaking. But it is not difficult to see that
the cognitive burden is still too high for it to be a feasible system for a large, living population to
use. Consider a simple thought experiment. If there are k cells, and each cell is allowed to have
one representative, and each representative is then allowed to expand by running in any other cell,
then it is theoretically possible that all the representatives choose to expand in one cell, say, Cell A.
If that occurs there will be at least k representatives on the ballot in Cell A in the next election.
This is unworkable if a realistic value of k is a thousand, or a million, or ten million. Let us say it
is not then a feasible democratic cellular voting system. However, democratic cellular voting, as a
concept, determines a very broad class of voting systems, so we turn next to the question of how
to define systems that bring the cognitive burden down to a feasible level.
As the thought experiment indicates, there are many reasonable ways to lower the theoretical
bound without restricting choices in ways that seem arbitrary. For example, a representative who
appears on a ballot whose base district is on the other side of the country would be considered
to be “coming out of nowhere.” The voters living somewhere cannot be expected to evaluate
representatives they do not “know” because they live in a far distant place and the social network
is removed in some sense. We can turn the representative away. Going like this it is not long before
we arrive at the conclusion that what is needed next is a continuous model.
This is a preliminary version of this paper. The results of the simulations are still pending. We
will report on these simulations when they are completed, in an update to this paper.
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